Since its predecessor's dissolution–Soviet Union–Russia’s role as big brother within the East has remained somewhat controversial, yet strategic. Post-Soviet collapse, the region between Armenia’s Eastern border, and correspondingly, Azerbaijan’s Western border, has become a heated playground for both periphery states to flex their arms while regional neighbours such as Russia and Turkey tactically intervene on a covert basis. Furthermore, while both of these states no longer fall under Russian jurisdiction, global powers have urged the Kremlin to deliver direct mediation between the two countries before tensions escalate beyond reasonable means. However, common debates have led analysts and the general public to question which country should reserve jurisdiction over the highly contested Nagorno-Karabakh (also referred to as NK or Artsakh) region (Paylan & Makalian 2021).
As Soviet Russia witnessed its inevitable collapse, ethnic minorities such as Soviet-Armenians residing within the NK region voiced their desire to depart from the former Soviet Azerbaijan, and instead return to the Armenian border (Crisis Group 2021). However, as Gorbachev installed his democratic pillars throughout Moscow, this provided a successful opportunity for fighting and warfare to take place for many years until 1994, in which ethnic minorities within NK, Armenia and Azerbaijan were immediately departed back to their ‘home’ countries (Crisis Group 2021). Since then, the NK region has rarely observed a moment of ceasefire with regular gunfights, mortar strikes and drone bombings lighting up the NK sky on a consistent basis (Crisis Group 2021).
Recently however, the Kremlin cracked under the pressure from its Western counterparts to broker a ceasefire, thus allowing both states to reconvene and potentially discuss peace options. However, this ceasefire did not prevent Azerbaijan from retrieving greater territory from the NK region (Crisis Group 2021). Aside from mediation, both Yerevan and Baku have sought military and economic aid from their war-mongering neighbours including that of Iran, Israel and Russia, thus also providing a window of opportunity for the bigger players to get involved and potentially transform NK into something similar to that of Aleppo; a proxy warfare playground (CSIS 2020).
Moreover, it is also questionable as to why neighbouring states would like such a great say into the NK conflict. It’s clear that neither Baku nor Yerevan has relinquished all its dependency on third-party intervention, and in no means does any side intend on falling back. Therefore, the generosity demonstrated on Baku and Yerevan’s neighbour’s is at the minimum, quite questionable. On the other hand however, Canada’s role within the conflict thus far has remained under a spotlight of suspicion. As Paylan and Makalian put it, the Canadian government's response and involvement within NK has been somewhat underwhelming with trade and export restrictions being the primary tactic to further deter states and regional powers from instigating any further conflict (Paylan & Makalian 2021).
Furthermore, Canada’s hand in NK is deeper than what is revealed through the actions of the Foreign Affairs office. Numerous investigations have discovered that Canadian weapons technology exported to the NK region was used to conduct various military protocols during the recent peak of the conflict, leaving a significant civilian and children casualty count (Paylan & Makalian 2021). Therefore, Paylan and Makalians claim of underwhelm towards Canada's efforts to diffuse the situation, holds definitely true, especially considering that its Foreign Affairs office is now linked to civilian deaths.
Aside from trade restrictions, Canada’s Foreign Affairs office has provided minimal effort throughout the process of diffusing the tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As regional powers such as Iran and Turkey begin to mount on each side of the conflict, tensions are continuing to increase, with a greater likelihood of an all-out war, or at the minimum a mass-proxy war being triggered at the earliest convenience. Yet, Canada’s only contribution to the conflict has resulted in Baku and Yerevan resorting to other means in order to achieve their domination of the region.
Overall, the NK crisis is not an easy-fix. Having persisted decades after its initial onset, NK has turned into a highly contested area with both sides of the conflict refusing to extend its courtesy to the other. Additionally, neighbouring regional powers have observed NK as an opportunity to transfer their on-going disputes and regional conflicts to a newer, more mountainous, playing field. As these regional war-hungry states prepare themselves for a mass-scale conflict, countries such as Canada and Russia, whom of which have contributed directly to escalations within the region, are taking the minimalist approach towards providing any form of resolution between the two states. As a result, both NK and the rest of the region remain in a state of confusion regarding Artsakhs’ future.
Perhaps an East-meets-West coalition to liberate Artsakh from this map-drawing contest? Sounds a bit too good to be true.
By: Jordan Salehi
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